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1 Introduction
Currently, there is a growing trend for various products to be connected to the Internet, which
is known as Internet of Things (IoT), and the connection of these products enables consumers to
benefit greatly from the other consumers who join the same network (so-called network externali-
ties). A typical example is a transition of home video games from oﬄine to online playing. In the
past, people enjoyed playing oﬄine video games with family or friends at home and, therefore, they
were not primarily concerned with the number of other users playing the game. Recently, however,
most games have been connected to the Internet, which allows players to enjoy such games with a
huge number of other players all over the world.1 These technological advancements have expanded
consumers’ effective network size, which is the size of network range where consumers actually care
about the other consumers. Thus, it is becoming more important to correctly predict how many
users are (or will be) playing the same game when making a purchasing decision. However, this
is not an easy task. In particular, there might be considerable heterogeneity among consumers
with respect to their predictive accuracies. How will such heterogeneity affect consumer behavior,
firm strategies, and the diffusion process of goods? The main purpose of this paper is to show the
optimal pricing and the diffusion process of durable goods that exhibit network externalities, when
consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their predictions about future network size.
We develop a simple infinite-period model in which a monopolistic firm produces a durable good
that exhibits network externalities. Consumers obtain utilities from the good for infinite periods
with discounting. At the same time, they become bored with the good from the continuous use
of it, that is, the good is assumed to be imperfectly durable and to depreciate. When consumers
decide whether to purchase the good, they must take into account not only the current network size
but also the future expansion of the network size. Katz and Shapiro (1985), the seminal work on
oligopoly pricing for goods with network externalities, assume fulfilled expectations of consumers
to capture this issue in a static one-period model, in which the actual network size is indeed equal
to the network size that consumers expected. In reality, however, not all consumers form rational
1For example, in 2016, League of Legends, a multiplayer online video game developed by Riot Games, had over
100 million monthly active players worldwide, which outnumber the population of Germany. The League of Legends
2017 World Championship attracted approximately 60 million unique viewers. See also the article in the Economist :
https://www.economist.com/business/2017/08/17/computer-game-tournaments-go-mainstream (accessed 7 Nov
2018).
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expectations. For example, some consumers may believe that the current network size will continue
as a constant over the future, whereas others, who possess greater information, can forecast the
future network size perfectly.
To consider such heterogeneity among consumers with respect to their beliefs about future
network sizes, our model consists of two types of consumers: sophisticated and naive consumers.
Sophisticated consumers have perfect foresight and, thus, can correctly anticipate how many con-
sumers will be participating in the network in future periods. Their expectations will be fulfilled, as
assumed in Katz and Shapiro (1985). On the other hand, naive consumers believe that the current
network size will continue as a constant in later periods and make their purchase decisions based on
such naive expectations. Note that, in this paper, consumers are homogeneous except with regard
to their expectations on future network sizes. Therefore, we can show how the heterogeneity of
such expectations affects the optimal pricing of a monopolistic provider and the diffusion of the
product.
Within the above framework of the model, this paper first considers the simple benchmark case
of fixed pricing, in which the monopoly firm offers its price at the initial period and commits to it
being fixed. We show that, unless the consumers become easily bored with the goods and/or the firm
heavily discounts its future profits, the firm embraces a sequential-diffusion strategy that induces
sophisticated consumers to purchase at the initial period and naive consumers to follow them and
purchase at the next period. Otherwise, it is optimal for the firm to adopt a simultaneous-diffusion
strategy, under which all consumers purchase at the initial period.
With the simultaneous-diffusion strategy, the firm can reap all profits at the initial period.
However, because the naive consumers believe, at the time of their purchase, that the current
market size, which is zero, will continue over the future periods, their willingness to pay for the good
would be low. Therefore, a large price discount is required to convince them to purchase along with
the sophisticated consumers at the initial period. On the other hand, with the sequential-diffusion
strategy, the firm can charge a higher price whereas the profit from the naive consumers will be
obtained at the second period. If the higher price is charged, naive consumers do not purchase the
good at the initial period. However, the sophisticated consumers rationally expect that if all the
sophisticated consumers purchase at the initial period, they will be able to profit from the larger
network size hereafter because the naive consumers will join the network at the next period. In
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sum, the advantages of the sequential-diffusion price would outweigh its disadvantages, unless the
consumers become easily bored with using the goods and/or the firm significantly discounts its
future profits. This result implies that whether the monopoly firm can exploit the sophisticated
consumers as early adopters crucially depend on the durability of the product, the discount rates
of the consumers and the firm, and the heterogeneity among consumers with respect to their
expectations on the future network path.
In addition, we show an interesting result that highlights the advantages of na¨ıvete´: in equi-
librium, sophisticated consumers never enjoy a greater surplus than do naive consumers. When
the simultaneous-diffusion strategy prevails in equilibrium, both sophisticated and naive consumers
derive the same surplus. However, when the sequential-diffusion strategy prevails, the surplus of
sophisticated consumers is strictly less than that of naive consumers. With the sequential-diffusion
price, sophisticated consumers can anticipate that naive consumers never join the network unless
all sophisticated consumers do so. Thus, sophisticated consumers have no other way than partic-
ipating in the network first to lead the subsequent entries of the naive consumers. As a result, at
the initial period, sophisticated consumers have to endure the small network externalities among
themselves and they become bored with the good to some extent before the network externalities
are maximized at the next period. Moreover, of special interest is when consumers become easily
bored. In this case, the equilibrium surplus of the sophisticated consumers converges to zero. In
other words, the firm can extract surplus from them perfectly.
From the viewpoint of the firm, the above discussion indicates that, with the sequential-diffusion
strategy, the firm can extract more surplus from sophisticated consumers. We demonstrate that,
as the ratio of sophisticated consumers increases, the firm charges a higher price and, thus, gains
greater profits. That is, the firm benefits from more consumers being sophisticated.
We extend the model in a way that the firm chooses different prices for every period, which
enables us to examine the optimal dynamic pricing and the resulting diffusion process. We consider
two pricing strategies with different degrees of price commitment: (i) responsive pricing, where the
firm adjusts the price at every period, and (ii) pre-announced pricing, where the firm commits
to the future price path at the initial period. In both cases, we derive a qualitatively similar
result regarding the optimality of sequential-diffusion pricing. Furthermore, we confirm that Coase
conjecture holds: committing to the future price path can raise the profits of the firm.
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Finally, we compare the profitability of the three different pricing strategies (fixed, responsive,
and pre-announced pricing) to answer the question of what the best commitment strategy is. Com-
mitting to the future price path (i.e., pre-announced pricing) is naturally the first-best strategy.
However, it would be difficult to make such a full commitment in reality. Therefore, the next
question concerns the second-best commitment strategy: Which is more profitable for the firm,
committing to a fixed price or not? We show that the answer depends on the rate at which con-
sumers become bored with the good, the discount factors for consumers and the firm, and the ratio
of the number of sophisticated consumers to that of naive consumers. Under the responsive pricing
(without price commitment), sophisticated consumers have a greater incentive to postpone their
purchase to the next period because doing so enables them to win a price discount and enjoy the
full network from their first period of use. Therefore, the firm has to charge a lower price at the
first period although it can charge a higher price at the second period to naive consumers who may
have the greater willingness to pay for the product. In contrast, by committing to a fixed price, the
firm can effectively extract a larger surplus from sophisticated consumers but may fail to do from
naive consumers. We find that it would be profitable to commit to a fixed price when consumers do
not heavily discount their future payoffs, the effective network size is large, and/or the proportion
of sophisticated consumers is large.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of the
related literature. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 analyzes the optimal pricing and the
diffusion process when the monopoly firm can commit to a fixed price. Section 5 considers responsive
and pre-announced pricing strategies. Section 6 addresses the first- and second-best commitment
strategies. Section 7 provides a discussion on the implications for management. Section 8 concludes
the paper. Proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
The existence of strategic forward-looking consumers is empirically reported. Hendel and Nevo
(2013) estimate the fraction of forward-looking consumers, who can stockpile the goods. Li et al.
(2014) estimate that 5.2% to 19.2% of the population is strategic, using data from the air-travel
industry. The structural models utilized in these papers provide empirical evidence that both
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strategic and non-strategic consumers coexist.2
The strategic relationship between firms and strategic consumers has been studied using theo-
retical frameworks of Management Science and Operations Research (e.g., Anily and Hassin, 2013;
Besanko and Winston, 1990; Besbes and Lobel, 2015; Cachon and Feldman, 2015; Cachon and Swin-
ney, 2009; Glazer and Hassin, 1986, 1990; Jerath et al., 2010; Liu and Van Ryzin, 2008; Mersereau
and Zhang, 2012).3 Regarding the effect of strategic consumers on firms’ profits, mixed results are
obtained: Su (2007) and Cho et al. (2009) find that there is a positive effect, whereas Anderson and
Wilson (2003), Aviv and Pazgal (2008), and Levin et al. (2009) reveal negative aspects. However,
these papers do not examine network externalities. Our results contribute to the literature by
showing that a monopolist selling a durable network good can benefit from an increase in the ratio
of sophisticated consumers.
This paper is related to the vast economic literature on network externalities, pioneered by
Katz and Shapiro (1985). In their rational expectations equilibrium, the actual network size does
indeed equal the network size that all consumers expected. Because all consumers are assumed
to have identical expectations regarding the network size and identical valuations of the good, the
model can be reduced to a one-period static model. Some studies that incorporate heterogeneity
among consumers with respect to their valuations for the good show that the price of durable goods
with network externalities increases over time, contrary to Coase (1972), that is, introductory or
penetration pricing prevails in equilibrium4 (e.g., Bensaid and Lesne, 1996; Cabral et al., 1999;
Cabral, 2011; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000).5 These papers assume that all consumers base their
purchase decisions on rational expectations.
On the other hand, there are some studies that incorporate consumers who lack the ability to
form forward-looking expectations, such that the utility of every consumer depends on the num-
ber of users at the moment of purchase, and is not affected by the future network size. (e.g.,
2Hendel and Nevo (2006) and Nair (2007) assume that all consumers are forward-looking, whereas Li et al. (2014)
do not assume the existence of strategic consumers a priori. Unlike in the present paper, those papers do not
incorporate network externalities among consumers.
3The revenue losses from ignoring strategic consumers are estimated to vary from 20% in Aviv and Pazgal (2008)
to 60% in Besanko and Winston (1990).
4Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) and Farrell and Saloner (1985) show that firms offer a low introductory price in
equilibrium. In these papers, however, the low price set at the initial period might be caused by competition among
firms that struggle to establish installed base customers in advance of their rival firms.
5Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) assume that consumers purchase the good only when they are young, to avoid
discussing Coasian dynamics. Bensaid and Lesne (1996) allow consumers to choose the timing of purchase in a
discrete time model.
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Arthur, 1989; Chen et al., 2009; Doganoglu, 2003; Makhdoumi et al., 2017; Mitchell and Skrzypacz,
2006).6 However, there has been little investigation of the dynamic pricing when consumers are
heterogeneous with respect to their expectations about the future network size of a durable good.
Radner et al. (2014) assume the existence of bounded rational consumers who do not pay attention
to the monopolist’s price announcement, that is, their decisions remain unchanged from the pre-
vious period. Miao (2010) considers two types of consumers: foresighted and myopic consumers.
Foresighted consumers maximize the discounted sum of their utilities, whereas myopic consumers
choose to optimize period-by-period. Unlike the myopic consumers of Miao (2010), we consider
naive consumers according to Cabral (2011), who defines the naive consumer as ‘one who assumes
that network size will remain at its current level, i.e. a consumer who fails to “solve” the model
and correctly predict the evolution of network size.’
This paper also relates to the recent literature on dynamic pricing with social learning, where
consumers who are ex ante unaware of the true valuation of the good will update their belief about
such an uncertain value based on the consumption history of early adopters. Most studies on social
learning assume that a firm can unilaterally choose how many and which consumers to sell the
good at every period (e.g., Aoyagi, 2010; Bhalla, 2013; Liu and Schiraldi, 2012; Parakhonyak and
Vikander, 2018; Zhou and Chen, 2018). Thus, they do not examine the forward-looking consumers’
strategic option to delay their purchases.
Some recent studies on social learning take such a consumers’ strategic delay into consideration,
where forward-looking consumers determine when to purchase the good (i.e., they can strategically
delay their purchasing decisions in anticipation of the product reviews of their peers). For example,
Papanastasiou and Savva (2017) show that, even though the social learning facilitates strategic
consumers to postpone their purchasing behaviors, its presence may improve the expected profit of
monopoly firm. Moreover, Aoyagi et al. (2016) consider a two-period model with the competition
between two differentiated firms. They show that the social learning imposes a downward pressure
on the price for period 1.
Ajorlou et al. (2016) studies the model of optimal dynamic pricing with social network, which is
similar to the model of social learning, where information about goods will be spread through word-
6Arthur (1989) considers an adoption process for technology, where agents sequentially come into the market
and choose which technology to adopt. However, optimal pricing is not investigated, that is, it is assumed that the
technologies are not sponsored or strategically manipulated by any profit-maximizing firm.
7
of-mouth communications among consumers. As in the literature of social learning, even though
there do not exist network externalities, consumers form their beliefs about the product’s quality
from reviews or word-of-mouth communications by those who have already purchased. Therefore,
the presence of social learning or social network incentivizes the firm to increase the number of
early adopters, which is captured in our model by naive consumers’ learning of the network value
from sophisticated early adopters. However, also in these strands of literature, there is no paper
that examines the heterogeneity among consumers with respect to their expectations about future
product diffusion.
In sum, to our knowledge, no paper provides theoretical predictions on optimal pricing and the
diffusion process for durable goods with network externalities when there are naive consumers as
well as forward-looking rational consumers. The paper contributes the literature by providing a
first step towards analyzing such the issue.
3 The Model
We consider an infinite-period model in which a monopolistic firm sells a durable good that exhibits
positive network externalities. Consumers obtain utility from using the good, which increases with
the number of other consumers using the good. The firm sets the price in the initial period, t = 1,
and commits to it for the subsequent periods to maximize the present discounted value. We will
relax this assumption in Section 5 such that the firm can set different prices in each period. We
denote the discount factor for the firm by δF ∈ [0, 1). We assume a constant marginal cost of
producing the good, which is normalized to zero.
Each consumer derives benefits from using the good for each period, denoted by v(nt) with
v′ > 0, where nt ∈ {1, · · · , n} is the non-negative integer representing the number of consumers
who join the network at period t. Thus, v(1) indicates the stand-alone benefit from using the
good. Here, n represents the maximum effective network range in which the good exhibits network
externalities, which depends on the type of the product. In the aforementioned example of oﬄine
games, n is considered to be small (at most 2 to 5 people including your close friends). But, in the
case of online games, n is considered to be so large (perhaps all of the players worldwide).7
7It should be noted that nt does not represent the actual total sales of the good at period t but represent the
number of consumers who join each of the effective network at period t.
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At the beginning of each period, consumers can observe the prior period’s network size (or the
total number of sales in each effective network) and then choose whether to purchase the good.
At the time of purchasing, each consumer forms an expectation about the continuation path of
future network sizes. In this respect, this paper considers two types of consumers: sophisticated
and naive consumers. We assume that the two types of consumers are identical except for their
expectations.8 We use nS and nN to denote the number of sophisticated and naive consumers,
respectively (n = nS + nN ). The proportions of nS and nN in each effective network are assumed
to be exogenously given and be common knowledge for all consumers and the firm.
Sophisticated consumers have perfect foresight and, thus, can correctly anticipate how many
consumers will be participating in the network for subsequent periods. That is, they can rationally
forecast the number of consumers at period t to be nt for all t ∈ T = {1, 2, · · · ,∞}. Let ueS(t)
and uS(t), respectively, be the expected and actual present discounted sum of utilities of the
sophisticated consumers, who purchase (and start using) the good at (from) period t. By definition,
the expected and the actual present discounted values of the sophisticated consumers are equal,
i.e., ueS(t) = uS(t). Then, we have:
ueS(t) = uS(t) =
∞∑
k=t
[
{δC · (1− β)}k−t · v(nk)
]
,
where δC ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor for consumers and β ∈ [0, 1) represents the depreciation
rate of the durable good, as in Bond and Samuelson (1984) and Suslow (1986).9 The depreciation
rate β can also be interpreted as the rate at which consumers become bored with the good. For
example, in the video game industry, players become bored with a game after continuous usage,
even if the game maintains a huge base of players.
In contrast, naive consumers do not (and cannot) anticipate the network sizes at any future
period and simply presume that the current network size will continue.10 Therefore, the naive
consumers decide whether to purchase the good based on the current network size that they perceive
8In this paper, consumers are homogeneous except with regard to their expectations on future network sizes. It
enables us to show how the heterogeneity of such expectations affects the optimal pricing and the diffusion of the
durable good with network externalities.
9Considering δC and β separately is important when analyzing the consumers’ decisions on whether to postpone
their purchases, as analyzed in Section 5.1.
10A naive consumer is defined as ‘one who assumes that network size will remain at its current level, i.e. a consumer
who fails to “solve” the model and correctly predict the evolution of network size.’ (Cabral, 2011: p.95)
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at the time of purchase. Let ueN (t) and uN (t), respectively, be the expected and actual present
discounted sum of utilities of the naive consumers, who purchase (and start using) the good at
(from) period t. These are given as follows.
ueN (t) =
∞∑
k=t
[
{δC · (1− β)}k−t · v(nt−1 + 1)
]
uN (t) =
∞∑
k=t
[
{δC · (1− β)}k−t · v(nk)
]
At the beginning of period t, each naive consumer recognizes the current network size to be
nt−1 and anticipates that it will be nt−1+1 for the subsequent periods if he/she purchases at that
period. Because all naive consumers make the same purchase decision (i.e., nk ≥ nt−1 + 1 for all
k ≥ t), it always holds that ueN (t) ≤ uN (t), which means that they could eventually obtain a higher
value than their willingness to pay they expected ex ante. In other words, the naive consumers
underestimate the network value of the good compared with the sophisticated consumers.
Let by Vi(t) = ui(t) − p denote the indirect utility function and let V ei (t) = uei (t) − p denote
the expected indirect utility function for i = {S,N}, where p is the price of the durable good
set by the firm. Henceforth, for simplicity, we define the consumers’ combined discount factor as
λC ≡ δC · (1− β) ∈ [0, 1).
4 Fixed Pricing
This section studies the benchmark case where the monopolist commits to a fixed price in the initial
period. First of all, we present the following three lemmas that characterize possible equilibrium
diffusion paths.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, there will never be a situation of diffusion in which naive consumers
purchase the goods before the sophisticated consumers do.
Proof. Suppose that the firm offers a price such that naive consumers are willing to purchase. Under
that price, sophisticated consumers would form a higher present discounted value than would naive
consumers because they can anticipate that all naive consumers will purchase the good. Thus,
sophisticated consumers will purchase the good first and they never purchase the good after naive
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consumers.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, there will never be a situation of diffusion in which only the sophisticated
consumers purchase and no naive consumer purchases.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a price such that only sophisticated consumers would purchase.
Note that this price needs to satisfy p ≤ ∑∞k=t [λk−tC · v(nS)]. At the next period, naive con-
sumers will observe that all sophisticated consumers have purchased the good. Here, the ex-
pected present discounted value of naive consumers is computed as
∑∞
k=t
[
λk−tC · v(nS + 1)
]
, which
is strictly greater than the price offered by the firm. Therefore, the naive consumers will follow the
sophisticated consumers after a delay of one period.
Lemma 3. In equilibrium, when naive consumers purchase later than the sophisticated consumers
do, their purchase cannot be delayed by more than one period.
Proof. Suppose that sophisticated consumers purchase the good at period 1. If no naive consumers
purchased at period 2, it might also be unprofitable for them to purchase at period 3 and later
periods.
From Lemmas 1, 2, and 3, in our model, the firm’s optimal pricing strategy is one of the following
two strategies. The first one is a simultaneous-diffusion strategy, in which the firm sets a price such
that both sophisticated and naive consumers simultaneously purchase the good at period 1. The
second one is a sequential-diffusion strategy, in which the firm offers a price such that sophisticated
consumers purchase at period 1 and act as early adopters, whereas naive consumers purchase the
good at period 2, following the lead of the sophisticated consumers.
In what follows, we derive the optimal price among all simultaneous-diffusion strategies in
Section 4.1 and among all sequential-diffusion strategies in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 addresses the
optimal strategy for the firm by comparing the profits derived in both strategies.
4.1 Simultaneous-diffusion strategy
To diffuse the good to both sophisticated and naive consumers at the same time, the price needs
to be less than or equal to the expected present discounted sum of utilities of all consumers. That
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is, letting psim be the simultaneous-diffusion price, the price should satisfy the following condition.
psim ≤ min{ueS(t = 1|psim), ueN (t = 1|psim)}
= min
{ ∞∑
t=1
λt−1C v(n),
∞∑
t=1
λt−1C v(1)
}
= min
{
v(n)
1− λC ,
v(1)
1− λC
}
=
v(1)
1− λC
The price is set at the expected present discounted sum of utilities of the naive consumers, that is,
psim = v(1)/(1−λC). Contrary to the expectations of the naive consumers, all consumers actually
join the network at period 1. Therefore, the ex-post or actual surplus of consumers is computed as
follows.
V simi =
∞∑
t=1
[
λt−1C v(n)
]− psim = v(n)− v(1)
1− λC (i = S,N)
The profit of the firm can be derived as nv(1)/(1−λC). The following proposition summarizes the
results.
Proposition 1. The optimal simultaneous-diffusion price such that both sophisticated and naive
consumers purchase at period 1 is as follows:
psim =
v(1)
1− λC
The corresponding profit and consumer surplus, respectively, are as follows:
pisim =
nv(1)
1− λC , V
sim
S = V
sim
N =
v(n)− v(1)
1− λC
Proposition 1 implies that the firm sets the price at the expected present discounted sum of
utilities of the naive consumers in order to diffuse the good to all consumers at period 1. It would
be necessary to aggressively discount the price to meet the preferences of the naive consumers. In
addition, we have the following corollary regarding consumer surplus.
Corollary 1. Both sophisticated and naive consumers derive the same surplus under the simultaneous-
diffusion pricing.
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4.2 Sequential-diffusion strategy
Here, we consider the optimal sequential-diffusion prices such that sophisticated consumers purchase
the good before naive consumers do. Let pseq be the sequential-diffusion price, which should satisfy
the following two conditions.
ueN (t = 1|pseq) <pseq ≤ ueS(t = 1|pseq) (1)
pseq ≤ ueN (t = 2|pseq) (2)
Inequality (1) implies that only sophisticated consumers purchase the good at period 1. Inequality
(2) guarantees that naive consumers will purchase at period 2 after observing that all sophisticated
consumers purchased at period 1. Given that pseq satisfies both inequalities, ueS(t = 1|pseq), ueN (t =
1|pseq), and ueN (t = 2|pseq) can be computed as follows.
ueS(t = 1|pseq) = v(nS) +
∞∑
t=2
[
λt−1C v(n)
]
= v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC
ueN (t = 1|pseq) =
∞∑
t=1
[
λt−1C v(1)
]
=
v(1)
1− λC
ueN (t = 2|pseq) =
∞∑
t=2
[
λt−2C v(nS + 1)
]
=
v(nS + 1)
1− λC
The firm offers the highest price that satisfies inequalities (1) and (2), which is equivalent to
min{ueS(t = 1|pseq), ueN (t = 2|pseq)}. We can state the following proposition regarding the optimal
prices among the sequential-diffusion prices.
Proposition 2. The optimal sequential-diffusion price such that sophisticated consumers purchase
before naive consumers do is given by:
pseq =

v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC if 0 ≤ λC ≤ λ¯C ,
v(nS + 1)
1− λC if λ¯C ≤ λC < 1,
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where
λ¯C ≡ v(nS + 1)− v(nS)
v(n)− v(nS) .
The corresponding profit and consumer surplus, respectively, are as follows.
piseq = pseq · nS + δF · pseq · nN
V seqS =

0 if 0 ≤ λC ≤ λ¯C
λC{v(n)− v(nS)} − {v(nS + 1)− v(nS)}
1− λC if λ¯C ≤ λC < 1
V seqN =

v(n)− v(nS) if 0 ≤ λC ≤ λ¯C
v(n)− v(nS + 1)
1− λC if λ¯C ≤ λC < 1
It is noteworthy that there is no incentive for any sophisticated consumer to delay purchase to
the next period. The price is set at a level at which naive consumers purchase the good at period
2 only if they observe that all sophisticated consumers have already purchased. If a sophisticated
consumer deviated from buying the good at period 1, no naive consumers would purchase at period
2. Therefore, the deviation never enables each sophisticated consumer to enjoy the largest network
size from the start of his/her use of the good, and never improves his/her payoffs.
Proposition 2 implies that the optimal price depends on the combined discount factor for
consumers λC . When consumers do not heavily discount and/or do not quickly become bored
with using the good (i.e., λC > λ¯C), the firm offers a price equal to the willingness to pay of
naive consumers at period 2, given that sophisticated consumers have already purchased, that is,
pseq = ueN (t = 2|pseq). Note that the willingness to pay of each naive consumer is formed based on
the belief that his/her purchase will increase the network size from nS to nS +1 because the naive
consumers cannot anticipate that other naive consumers also join the network at the same time. In
contrast to their forecast, all naive consumers do join the network eventually. Thus, although the
price is set at the willingness to pay of the naive consumers, they can eventually derive a positive
surplus. In sum, both sophisticated and naive consumers enjoy a positive surplus.
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Of special interest is the case in which consumers heavily discount and/or quickly become bored
(i.e., λC < λ¯C). In this case, as u
e
S(t = 1|pseq) < ueN (t = 2|pseq), the firm offers a price equal to the
willingness to pay of the sophisticated consumers at period 1, that is, pseq = ueS(t = 1|pseq). Because
their willingness to pay is based on their perfect forecast of the future network sizes, unlike naive
consumers, the surplus of the sophisticated consumers becomes zero. On the other hand, naive
consumers purchase the good after observing that all sophisticated consumers have purchased at
period 1, which implies that a sufficient size of the network has been established. Therefore, only
naive consumers can gain a positive surplus. Note that the parameter range narrows as the effective
network size increases, that is, λ¯C goes to 0 as n increases. As n gets larger, at period 2, there
is a larger difference between the network size that the naive consumers expect, nS + 1, and the
actually formed network size, n. In other words, naive consumers significantly underestimate the
discounted sum of utilities from the network, that is, ueN (t = 2|pseq) becomes smaller compared with
ueS(t = 1|pseq). Therefore, when the effective network size is large, ueS(t = 1|pseq) < ueN (t = 2|pseq)
tends not to be satisfied, which leads to a small value of λ¯C .
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We have the following corollary regarding the consumer surplus.
Corollary 2. Naive consumers derive a higher surplus than do sophisticated consumers with the
sequential-diffusion price. That is, it always holds that V seqS < V
seq
N .
The intuition behind the advantage of na¨ıvete´ in Corollary 2 is that sophisticated consumers
have to endure the disadvantages of the small network at period 1, whereas naive consumers can
enjoy benefits of the full network from the beginning of their use of the product.
4.3 Optimal diffusion strategy
Here, using the results derived in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we address the optimal fixed pricing for
a monopolistic firm. First, comparing the simultaneous- and sequential-diffusion prices yields the
following lemma.
11The denominator of λ¯C ∈ (0, 1] represents the network value generated by the additional participation of all naive
consumers, and the numerator represents the incremental network value. It is easily shown that λ¯C is decreasing in
the number of naive consumers nN and λ¯C = 1 when nN = 1. Therefore, the critical value λ¯C is considered as the
accuracy of naive consumers’ expectations because the naive consumers’ underestimation for network values will be
smaller with a smaller number of naive consumers.
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Figure 1: Simultaneous- vs. sequential-diffusion pricing
Lemma 4. The sequential-diffusion price is always higher than the simultaneous-diffusion price.
That is, psim < pseq holds.
Lemma 4 confirms the predictable result that the firm can charge a higher price to diffuse the
good sequentially. Next, comparing the profits with simultaneous- and sequential-diffusion prices,
we have the following proposition regarding the optimal pricing of the firm.
Proposition 3. It is optimal for the monopolistic firm to charge the sequential-diffusion price pseq
if and only if the discount factor for the firm is large enough to satisfy δF > max {f(λC) , 0},
where
f(λC) =

nv(1)− nS {λCv(n) + (1− λC)v(nS)}
nN {λCv(n) + (1− λC)v(nS)} if 0 ≤ λC ≤ λ¯C ,
nv(1)− nSv(nS + 1)
nNv(nS + 1)
if λ¯C ≤ λC < 1.
Otherwise, it is optimal to charge the simultaneous-diffusion price psim.
Note that f(λC) is decreasing for λC ∈ [0, λ¯C ] and is constant for λC ∈ [λ¯C , 1]. Figure 1 shows
the partition of the equilibrium price by the firm using numerical analysis.
All three panels of the figure show that the firm offers the sequential-diffusion price when δF
is larger than the critical value f(λC), indicating that the sequential-diffusion strategy is more
profitable for the firm when the firm’s discount factor is sufficiently large. It seems to be a nat-
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ural result. With the simultaneous-diffusion strategy, all profits can be obtained without being
discounted, but a large price discount is required to make naive consumers purchase along with
sophisticated consumers, as shown in Lemma 4. In contrast, with the sequential-diffusion strategy,
the profit from naive consumers will be obtained later at period 2. However, as shown in Lemma
4, the firm can charge a higher price because of the leadership of sophisticated consumers.
In addition, the left and center panels of the figure illustrate the case of v(nt) = nt, indicating
that the sequential-diffusion pricing would be optimal for the firm if the effective network size is
sufficiently large. The left panel shows the case where the effective network size is small, indicating
that the simultaneous-diffusion strategy is more likely to be beneficial if the combined discount
factor of the consumer is small. Finally, the right panel illustrates the case where v(nt) = n
0.2
t ,
implying weak network externalities. A comparison of the center and right panels of the figure
indicates that the stronger is the network effect of the durables, the greater is the advantage of the
sequential-diffusion strategy for the firm.12
Furthermore, with Corollaries 1 and 2, we obtain the following corollay with respect to the
surpluses of both consumer types.
Corollary 3. Under the fixed pricing, sophisticated consumers never enjoy a greater surplus than
do naive consumers.
Under the simultaneous-diffusion strategy, both types of consumers derive the same surplus
because they purchase the good at the same price and at the same time. More interestingly, under
the sequential-diffusion strategy, the surplus of sophisticated consumers is less than that of naive
consumers. With the sequential-diffusion price, naive consumers never join the network before
sophisticated consumers (the early adopters) do so. Because sophisticated consumers expect such
behavior of the naive consumers, they have no option but to participate in the network first. As a
result, sophisticated consumers have to endure the disadvantages of a small network at period 1.
However, when the naive consumers purchase at the next period, they can immediately enjoy the
advantages of the largest network size. Therefore, naive consumers obtain a greater surplus than
do sophisticated consumers.
12Proposition 3 also indicates that f(λC) is increasing in v(1), implying that the larger the stand-alone benefit for
using the product, the more likely it is to charge simultaneous-diffusion price.
17
Let us reconsider the above discussion from the viewpoint of the firm. Under the simultaneous-
diffusion strategy, the firm extracts the same surplus from every consumer. On the other hand,
under the sequential-diffusion strategy, the firm can extract more surplus from the sophisticated
consumers by charging a higher price to all consumers. In summary, we can state the following
proposition regarding the preceding discussion.
Proposition 4. Assume that the total effective number of consumers n is constant. Let α ∈ [0, 1) be
the ratio of sophisticated consumers, that is, nS = αn and nN = (1−α)n. Then, the simultaneous-
diffusion price psim does not depend on α, whereas an increase in α raises the sequential-diffusion
price pseq and the profit of the firm piseq.
Proposition 4 provides the comparative statics of the firm’s profit with respect to the ratio
between the two types of consumers. It shows that the simultaneous-diffusion price does not depend
on the ratio between the sophisticated and naive consumers. However, under the sequential-diffusion
strategy, as the ratio of sophisticated consumers increases, the firm charges them the higher price
and then gains a greater profit. That is, the firm benefits from more consumers being sophisticated.
5 Responsive and Pre-Announced Pricing Strategies
The purpose of this section is to confirm the robustness of Proposition 3, that the sequential-
diffusion strategy prevails in equilibrium unless the firm heavily discounts its future profits, even if
the firm can set different prices at each period.
Section 5.1 considers the case of responsive pricing, in which the firm can dynamically adjust the
price at every period. We also consider the case of pre-announced pricing in Section 5.2, in which
the firm can commit to the future price path that it will charge. After confirming the robustness
of our main result in both cases, Section 5.3 confirms that Coase conjecture, that committing to a
future price path improves the firm’s profit, holds.
5.1 Responsive pricing
Let pt be the price of the good at period t. As in Section 4, we focus on the simultaneous-
and sequential-diffusion strategies. Obviously, the ability of the firm to change its prices across
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periods (or equivalently, the lack of a price commitment) does not affect the equilibrium level
of simultaneous-diffusion prices, under which all consumers purchase the good at period 1. The
following proposition shows the condition for which there exists the optimal sequential-diffusion
strategy in the case where the firm can adjust its price at every period.
Proposition 5. If the consumers’ discount factor and the depreciation rate are small enough to
satisfy:
δCβ <
v(nS)− v(1)
v(n)− v(nS) , (3)
then there exists the price pair (pˆseq1 , pˆ
seq
2 ) such that sophisticated consumers purchase at period 1
and naive consumers purchase at period 2, where pˆseq1 and pˆ
seq
2 are given by
pˆseq1 =
v(nS)− δCβ{v(n)− v(nS)}
1− λC , pˆ
seq
2 =
v(nS + 1)
1− λC .
The corresponding profit and consumer surplus, respectively, are as follows.
pˆiseq = pˆseq1 nS + δF · pˆseq2 nN , Vˆ seqS = δC ·
v(n)− v(nS)
1− λC , Vˆ
seq
N =
v(n)− v(nS + 1)
1− λC .
Otherwise, if inequality (3) does not hold, then the unique responsive pricing would be the simultaneous-
diffusion one and the corresponding price, profit, and consumer surplus equal to the ones given in
Proposition 1.
Equation (3) represents the condition under which the sequential-diffusion strategy prevails in
equilibrium. Compared with the fixed-pricing case, in this case, sophisticated consumers have a
greater strategic incentive to postpone their purchases in order to match the timing of purchase with
naive followers because doing so could reduce the price offered at period 2. Details are provided
in the Appendix, but let us briefly explain the intuition behind it. Proposition 5 shows that pˆseq1
is decreasing in β, that is, the period 1 price decreases as consumers become easily bored. When
consumers become easily bored with a product, sophisticated consumers have a greater incentive
to start using the good when the network is at its largest possible size. In other words, each
sophisticated consumer would be likely to delay purchase to the next period in which all the naive
19
consumers will join the network. As a result of these deviation incentives, the firm cannot charge
the higher price at period 1. On the other hand, if the firm offers too low a price, naive consumers
will also purchase the good at period 1. Therefore, under responsive pricing, the firm cannot
perform the sequential-diffusion strategy when consumers become easily bored with the product.
Next, we derive the condition under which the sequential-diffusion strategy is more profitable
for the firm when it can adjust its price at every period, as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Suppose that the monopolistic firm can adjust its price at every period. It is
optimal for the firm to charge the sequential-diffusion prices (pˆseq1 , pˆ
seq
2 ) if and only if the discount
factor for the firm is large enough to satisfy δF > max
{
fˆ(δC , β) , 0
}
, where
fˆ(δC , β) ≡ nv(1)− nS {v(nS)− δCβ (v(n)− v(nS))}
nN · v(nS + 1) .
Proposition 6 implies that it is more profitable for the firm to charge the sequential-diffusion
prices unless the discount factor for the firm is too small. Therefore, the result of Proposition 3 is
qualitatively unchanged even if the firm can adjust its price at every period.
Proposition 6 also implies that ∂fˆ(δC , β)/∂δC = ∂fˆ(δC , β)/∂β > 0. With responsive pricing,
the sequential-diffusion pricing is more likely to be beneficial to the firm when consumers discount
the future payoff more (i.e., when δC gets smaller) and/or when consumers become bored less
easily (i.e., when β gets smaller). In contrast, with fixed pricing, we have ∂f(λC)/∂δC ≤ 0 and
∂f(λC)/∂β ≥ 0. That is, the change in δC has the opposite impact on the thresholds under the
fixed and responsive pricing strategies. An increase in δC directly increases the present discount
value and the willingness to pay of all consumers. Under fixed pricing, this direct effect enables the
firm to charge the higher sequential-diffusion price because the firm commits to the fixed price such
that no sophisticated consumers benefit by delaying their purchase. However, if the firm cannot
make such a binding commitment but adopts responsive pricing, the increase in δC also affects the
behavior of sophisticated consumers. As δC becomes larger, the sophisticated consumers have a
greater incentive to delay their purchases to the next period, which would lead the firm to offer a
larger price discount. As a result, under responsive pricing, the second indirect effect dominates
the first direct effect. That is why an increase in δC makes the sequential-diffusion strategy less
profitable for the firm.
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5.2 Pre-announced pricing
Here, we consider the case in which the firm can perfectly commit to a future price path. For the
same reason as in Section 5.1, we first analyze the sequential-diffusion strategy and then find the
condition under which the sequential-diffusion strategy is optimal for the firm.
Proposition 7. When the monopolist can commit to a future price path, the optimal price pair
(p˜seq1 , p˜
seq
2 ), such that sophisticated consumers purchase at period 1 and naive consumers purchase
at period 2, is given by:
p˜seq1 = v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC , p˜
seq
2 =
v(nS + 1)
1− λC ,
The corresponding profit and consumer surplus, respectively, are as follows.
p˜iseq = p˜seqnS + δF · p˜seqnN , V˜ seqS = 0, V˜ seqN =
v(n)− v(nS + 1)
1− λC
The firm sets the period 1 price at the level of the sophisticated consumers’ willingness to pay.
Similarly, the period 2 price is set at the naive consumers’ willingness to pay. Because sophisticated
consumers form fulfilled expectations, their surplus will be fully extracted by the firm. In contrast,
because naive consumers underestimate the network value of the good at the time of purchase, they
can eventually gain a positive surplus.
Next, we derive the condition under which the sequential-diffusion strategy is more profitable
for the firm when it can commit to a future price path, as summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 8. Suppose that the monopolistic firm can commit to a future price path. It is optimal
for the firm to charge the sequential-diffusion prices (p˜seq1 , p˜
seq
2 ) if and only if the discount factor
for the firm is large enough to satisfy δF > max
{
f˜(λC) , 0
}
, where:
f˜(λC) ≡ nv(1)− nS {(1− λC)v(nS) + λCv(n)}
nN · v(nS + 1) .
Proposition 8 confirms the robustness of Proposition 3, that is, the sequential-diffusion strategy
is optimal for the firm unless the firm greatly discounts its future profits.
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5.3 Profitability of pre-announcement
Here, we check Coase conjecture that committing to a future price path can improve the profit of
the monopolist. To this end, comparing pˆiseq and p˜iseq yields the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Committing to the future price path improves the profit of the monopolistic firm.
It can be easily shown that pˆiseq < p˜iseq, which implies that Coase conjecture holds in our model
with naive consumers. From Propositions 5 and 7, we can see pˆseq1 < p˜
seq
1 and pˆ
seq
2 = p˜
seq
2 . When
the firm cannot commit to its future prices, it must discount the period 1 price to prevent the
sophisticated consumers from postponing their purchases to the next period. However, when the
firm commits to the period 2 price, the sophisticated consumers cannot obtain any price discount
by postponing their purchase. As a result, the firm benefits from committing to the future price
path because it can charge the higher price at period 1.
6 First- and Second-Best Commitment Strategies
So far, we have analyzed three pricing strategies: fixed, responsive, and pre-announced pricing
strategies. This section demonstrates the first- and second-best strategies for the firm. To this end,
we confine our attention to the parameter range in which the firm adopts the sequential-diffusion
strategy, which is equivalent to δF ∈ [max{f(λC), fˆ(δC , β), f˜(λC), 0}, 1).
First, it can easily be seen that pre-announced pricing is the optimal strategy for the firm
among the three strategies. Proposition 9 shows that pre-announced pricing is more profitable
than responsive pricing. It is also preferable to fixed pricing, as indicated by the strategy space of
the fixed pricing being a subset of the strategy space of the pre-announced pricing. Therefore, the
pre-announced pricing is the first-best strategy if it is possible for the firm to implement it.
However, in reality, it is difficult for the firm to credibly commit to the complete path of future
prices at the initial period, but committing to a fixed price may be more implementable. Thus, a
comparison of fixed and responsive pricing indicates the second-best strategy regarding the firm’s
commitment. We have the following lemma regarding the order of the sequential-diffusion prices
under both cases.
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Lemma 5. The sequential-diffusion prices under fixed pricing (pseq) and responsive pricing (pˆseq1
and pˆseq2 ) are ordered as follows:
pˆseq1 < p
seq < pˆseq2 if 0 ≤ λC < λ¯C
pˆseq1 < pˆ
seq
2 = p
seq if λ¯C ≤ λC < 1.
Lemma 5 implies that pˆseq1 is always lower than pˆ
seq
2 . In other words, when the firm can adjust
the price at every period, the introductory or penetration pricing prevails in equilibrium, as shown
in Bensaid and Lesne (1996) and Cabral et al. (1999).
When λC is large enough to satisfy λC ≥ λ¯C , the fixed sequential-diffusion price pseq is higher
than pˆseq1 and is equal to pˆ
seq
2 . Therefore, in this case, it is obviously more profitable to commit to
the fixed price. In contrast, when λC is smaller than λ¯C , p
seq is higher than pˆseq1 and lower than
pˆseq2 , which increases the possibility that the firm will benefit by employing responsive pricing. We
find the condition under which responsive pricing is more beneficial than fixed pricing.
Proposition 10. Suppose that the discount factor for the firm is large enough to satisfy δF ∈
[max{f(λC), fˆ(δC , β), 0}, 1). If
λ¯C − λC > δC
δF
· nS
nN
, (4)
then it is unprofitable for the firm to commit to the fixed price at period 1. Otherwise, the firm can
benefit from committing to the fixed price.
Proposition 10 shows three results: (i) if λC ≥ λ¯C , the condition (4) is not satisfied, that is,
fixed pricing is always more profitable than responsive pricing; (ii) when λ < λ¯C , as δC/δF and/or
nS/nN become smaller, responsive pricing is more likely to be profitable than fixed pricing; and
(iii) when the effective network size n is small, λ¯C becomes large, which increases the likelihood
that responsive pricing is more likely to be profitable than fixed pricing.
The intuition behind the results is as follows. Result (i) is obvious from Lemma 5. With
regard to Result (ii), under sequential-diffusion pricing, some price discounts are required to prevent
sophisticated consumers from delaying their purchases to the next period. Under fixed pricing, these
price discounts will be applied not only to sophisticated consumers but also to naive consumers. In
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Figure 2: Fixed vs. responsive pricing strategies (α = 0.2, δF = 0.9).
contrast, under responsive pricing, the firm can stop discounting for naive consumers by adjusting its
price at period 2. If δC/δF becomes smaller, then larger price discounts are required, which increases
the advantage of responsive pricing. If nS/nN becomes smaller, then, under fixed pricing, the price
discounts would apply to naive consumers, which also increases the advantages of responsive pricing.
Finally, regarding Result (iii), λ¯C will take a large value when the effective network size is small,
as discussed in Section 4.2. As shown in Proposition 2, when λ¯C is large, the willingness to pay
of the sophisticated consumers is lower than that of the naive consumers. As a result, under fixed
pricing, the sequential-diffusion price tends to be set at the level of the sophisticated consumers’
willingness to pay, and is also applied to naive consumers, despite their higher willingness to pay.
In contrast, under responsive pricing, the firm will be able to adjust its price at period 2 to avoid
discounting the price offered to naive consumers. Thus, when the effective network effect is small,
responsive pricing is more likely to be profitable than fixed pricing.
Finally, we perform numerical analyses to illustrate the above results of Proposition 10 and to
discuss how the result would be affected by the effective network size, n. We consider a sufficiently
large value of δF = 0.9 for the sequential-diffusion strategy to be optimal. In addition, we let
v(nt) =
√
nt and α = 0.2, that is, nS = 0.2n and nN = 0.8n. Note that varying α does not
qualitatively change our numerical results. In each panel of Figure 2, we define g1(δC) and g2(δC)
as follows:
g1(δC) ≡ v(nS)− v(1)
v(n)− v(nS) ·
1
δC
, g2(δC) ≡ 1−
(
λ¯C
δC
− nS
δFnN
)
,
where the former comes from condition (3) in Proposition 5 and the latter from condition (4) in
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Proposition 10. In the region of β < g1(δC), sophisticated consumers purchase at period 1 and
naive consumers purchase at period 2. In the region of β > g2(δC), the firm can obtain higher
profits under responsive pricing than under fixed pricing. The shaded area of each graph in the
figure represents the parameter region where responsive pricing is more profitable for the firm,
which shrinks gradually as n increases. In other words, when the effective network size is relatively
small, it would be profitable for the firm to make no commitments to future prices.
7 Managerial Implications
One of the important messages from our study is that the sequential-diffusion strategy is profitable
for the monopolistic firm selling durable goods that exhibit network externalities, unless consumers
quickly become bored with using the goods and/or unless the firm heavily discounts its future
profits. Furthermore, sophisticated consumers, because of their sophistication, get lower surplus
than do naive consumers. In other words, the existence of sophisticated consumers enables the
firm to charge a higher price. The main driver of these results is the existence of naive consumers
who have a lower willingness to pay than do the sophisticated consumers at the initial period.
Even if the price was set higher than the naive consumers’ willingness to pay at the initial period
(i.e., the stand-alone benefit), sophisticated consumers anticipate that naive consumers will join the
network after observing the network expansion generated by sophisticated consumers. Therefore,
sophisticated consumers have no option but to participate in the network first, before its size
expands, to entice the naive consumers to subsequently enter into the network. In other words,
sophisticated consumers have to take the leadership role to indicate the true value of the network
to the naive consumers. This is the reason why the existence of the naive consumers sustains
the firm’s sequential-diffusion strategy in equilibrium. Moreover, sophisticated consumers have to
endure the disadvantages of the small network size before the naive consumers join the network,
whereas naive consumers can enjoy the largest network size immediately, as soon as they purchase
the good. For this reason, the sophisticated consumers never gain a greater surplus than that of
the naive consumers.
An important lesson from our model for firms selling durable goods with network externalities
is that information about the current network size must be disclosed by the firm at the beginning of
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every period. If the firm does not construct such an information disclosure system, naive consumers
never realize that the sophisticated consumers have purchased the good. Then, this lack of learning
opportunities dampens the incentives of the sophisticated consumers to join the network first. That
is, the firm has to make information about the current number of users and/or the sales volume
public.
In addition, it is important not only to disclose information about the current network size,
but also to provide an environment that assists more consumers to predict the future network size
correctly. Proposition 4 shows that the firm can benefit from an increase in the ratio of sophisticated
consumers. Therefore, the firm should supply information to consumers to decrease the proportion
of naive consumers who cannot predict the purchase decisions of others. For example, the existence
of a word-of-mouth viral site, where consumers can communicate with each other about the good,
may help naive consumers to determine other consumers’ purchasing intentions.
Moreover, in Proposition 10 and the corresponding numerical analysis, we show that, as the
effective network size and/or the proportion of sophisticated consumers become larger, the ad-
vantage of fixed pricing (committing to a fixed price) against responsive pricing (pricing without
commitment) becomes greater. Recent movements to establish an IoT might enlarge the maxi-
mum effective network range, n, in which the product exhibits network externalities, which makes
consumers more sensitive to others’ purchase decisions. In addition, the recent development of
social networking has made it easier for consumers to sophisticatedly predict the future dissemi-
nation of products. The trends may enhance the managerial significance of committing to a fixed
price. Often, in reality, it may be difficult to promise to hold prices constant for long periods. A
most-favored-customer clause is one potential strategy for doing so. This clause is an agreement
between a seller and a buyer in which a seller commits to the buyer not to sell to other buyers at a
lower price. Thus, by imposing the most-favored-customer clause, the firm can commit not to raise
its price over the future. However, the use of the most-favored-customer clauses may have been
of interest to antitrust authorities because it reduces firms’ incentives to lower their prices (e.g.,
Cooper, 1986; Schnitzer, 1994).
Another potential strategy is a pre-order or subscription sales system. Using our model, we
explain how to use pre-order sales to commit to a fixed price. At the beginning of period 1, the
firm announces that it will receive pre-orders at the price pseq and that the deadline for pre-orders
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is the end of period 2. Sophisticated consumers may pre-order at period 1. At the beginning of
period 2, the firm should announce the number of pre-orders it has received. After observing the
announcement, the naive consumers follow the sophisticated consumers to pre-order the good. This
strategy not only enables the firm to credibly commit to maintaining its price at pseq during the
pre-order period, but also informs sophisticated consumers of such a commitment. As a result, the
firm can sell the good to all consumers at pseq.
From the social welfare point of view, the simultaneous diffusion of network durables is better
than the sequential one because the former enables all consumers to enjoy full network at their
first period of use without any delay. However, as our results show, a monopolist selling network
durable goods can intentionally slow down the speed of diffusion of the goods taking advantages
of consumers’ heterogeneity in their knowledge. If all consumers are sophisticated, or all are
naive, the monopolist will choose the simultaneous-diffusion strategy and no welfare loss arises. In
other words, the diversity in consumers’ knowledge allows the monopolist to choose the sequential-
diffusion strategy, leading to socially excessive delay in the diffusion of the goods.
8 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the optimal pricing and diffusion of durable goods that exhibit positive
network externalities. A key departure in our paper from many existing studies is to consider
the existence of naive consumers as well as sophisticated (rational) consumers. In our model,
in contrast to sophisticated consumers, naive consumers do not anticipate the network sizes at
any future period, simply believing that the current network size will be maintained for future
periods. This heterogeneity among consumers significantly alters the optimal pricing strategy and
the diffusion of durable goods.
Our hope is that the framework we have developed can be a first step towards analyzing the
dynamic pricing and the diffusion of durable goods with the heterogeneity among consumers with
respect to their predictive accuracies. We mention a couple of future research agenda.
First, this paper assumes that consumers live for infinite periods, that is, they do not exit
from the network that they join. This assumption means naive consumers underestimate the
network value of the good compared with sophisticated consumers. In a model where consumers
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can exit from the network, naive consumers who cannot predict the exit of other consumers would
overestimate the network value of the good. In this case, the results obtained in this paper might
change. That is a potentially fruitful direction for future research
Second, we assume that consumers are homogeneous except with regard to their expectations
on future network sizes to focus to how the heterogeneity of their expectations affects the optimal
pricing and the diffusion of durable goods with network externalities. It would also be interesting
to see how the diversity in consumers valuation for the good as well as in their expectations affects
the optimal pricing and the diffusion patterns of the good.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2
The comparison of ueS(t = 1|pseq) and ueN (t = 2|pseq) yields the following condition.
ueS(t = 1|pseq) > ueN (t = 2|pseq) ⇐⇒ v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC >
v(nS + 1)
1− λC
⇐⇒ λC >
v(nS + 1)− v(nS)
v(n)− v(nS) ≡ λ¯C
Thus, if λC > λ¯C , the price is set at p
seq = ueN (t = 2|pseq). Otherwise, the price is set at
ueS(t = 1|pseq). Using this, we can obtain the corresponding profit, as shown in Proposition 2.
When λC is larger than λ¯C , the surpluses of the sophisticated and naive consumers, respectively,
can be computed as follows.
V seqS = uS(t = 1|pseq)− ueN (t = 2|pseq)
=
[
v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC
]
− v(nS + 1)
1− λC =
λC{v(n)− v(nS)} − {v(nS + 1)− v(nS)}
1− λC
V seqN = uN (t = 2|pseq)− ueN (t = 2|pseq) =
v(n)
1− λC −
v(nS + 1)
1− λC =
v(n)− v(nS + 1)
1− λC
Similarly, the consumer surplus can be computed when λC is smaller than λ¯C , as follows.
V seqS = uS(t = 1|pseq)− ueS(t = 1|pseq) = 0
28
V seqN = uN (t = 2|pseq)− ueS(t = 1|pseq) =
v(n)
1− λC −
[
v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC
]
= v(n)− v(nS)
Proof of Corollary 2
First, when λC ≤ λ¯C , V seqS = 0 and V seqN = v(n)− v(nS) > 0. Thus, it holds that V seqS < V seqN .
Next, when λC ≥ λ¯C , we can show V seqS < V seqN as follows.
V seqN − V seqS =
v(n)− v(nS + 1)
1− λC −
λC{v(n)− v(nS)} − {v(nS + 1)− v(nS)}
1− λC
= v(n)− v(nS) > 0
Proof of Lemma 4
For λC ∈ [λ¯C , 1), it is easily seen that psim < pseq as follows.
pseq − psim = v(nS + 1)
1− λC −
v(1)
1− λC > 0
We can also show psim < pseq for λC ∈ [0, λ¯C ] as follows.
pseq − psim = v(nS) + λCv(n)
1− λC −
v(1)
1− λC =
(1− λC)v(nS) + λCv(n)− v(1)
1− λC
>
v(nS)− v(1)
1− λC > 0
Proof of Proposition 3
Two possible cases should be considered.
(i) 0 ≤ λC ≤ λ¯C
In this case, it holds that pseq = ueS(t = 1|pseq). Comparing the profits under simultaneous-
and sequential-diffusion prices, we have the following condition for piseq > pisim.
piseq − pisim = (nS + δFnN )
[
v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC
]
− n · v(1)
1− λC
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=
(nS + δFnN ) {(1− λC)v(nS) + λCv(n)} − nv(1)
1− λC
> 0
⇐⇒ δF >
nv(1)− nS {λCv(n) + (1− λC)v(nS)}
nN {λCv(n) + (1− λC)v(nS)} ≡ f1(λC)
where f ′1(λC) = −
nv(1) {v(n)− v(nS)}
nN {λCv(n) + (1− λC)v(nS)}2
< 0
(ii) λ¯C ≤ λC < 1
In this case, it holds that pseq = ueN (t = 2|pseq). Comparing the profits under simultaneous-
and sequential-diffusion prices, we have the following condition for piseq > pisim.
piseq − pisim = (nS + δFnN )v(nS + 1)
1− λC − n ·
v(1)
1− λC
=
nSv(nS + 1)− nv(1) + δF · nNv(nS + 1)
1− λC
> 0
⇐⇒ δF > nv(1)− nSv(nS + 1)
nNv(nS + 1)
≡ f2(λC)
Proof of Proposition 4
Fix the total number of consumers at n. Let nS = αn and nN = (1− α)n. First, it is obvious
that psim = v(1)/(1− λC) is independent of α. Next, pseq can be rewritten as
pseq =

v(αn) +
λCv(n)
1− λC if 0 ≤ λC ≤ λ¯C ,
v(αn+ 1)
1− λC if λ¯C ≤ λC < 1,
which is increasing in α. Finally, we prove that piseq is also increasing in α as follows.
piseq = pseq · αn+ δF · pseq · (1− α)n = npseq {α+ δF (1− α)}
∂piseq
∂α
= n
∂pseq
∂α
{α+ δF (1− α)}+ npseq(1− δF ) > 0
30
Proof of Proposition 5
We find the optimal price such that all sophisticated consumers purchase at period 1 and all
naive consumers purchase at period 2. Then, we will confirm that sophisticated consumers have no
incentive to postpone their purchases to the next period. That is, there is no equilibrium in which
only a portion of the sophisticated consumers purchase in period 1.
In order for sequential diffusion to occur in equilibrium, the period 1 price must be high enough
to satisfy pˆseq1 > v(1)/(1 − λC) because naive consumers also purchase at period 1 if it holds that
pˆseq1 ≤ v(1)/(1− λC).
First, we consider the period 2 price, pˆseq2 , given that all sophisticated consumers purchase at
period 1. At the beginning of period 2, all naive consumers observe that the current network size
is nS . In addition, each of them anticipates that if he/she joins the network, the network size will
become nS + 1, which will be continued over future periods. Therefore, the firm sets the period 2
price at pˆseq2 = v(nS + 1)/(1− λC) to make all naive consumers purchase.
Next, let us consider the decision regarding the period 1 price, pˆseq1 . The indirect utility of
sophisticated consumers at period 1 is given by:
VS = v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC − pˆ
seq
1 .
Note that pˆseq1 should be set so that each sophisticated consumer has no inventive to postpone
purchase to the next period. Consider a situation in which one sophisticated consumer deviates
from the equilibrium path. In the situation, at period 2, the naive consumers consider that the
network size will become nS if he/she purchases the good. Therefore, the period 2 price will be set at
p′2 = v(nS)/(1−λC). Because all remaining consumers actually join the network, the sophisticated
consumer who deviated will gain the following surplus:
V ′S =
v(n)− v(nS)
1− λC
The condition under which all sophisticated consumers have no inventive to deviate from purchasing
at period 1 is that VS ≥ δCV ′S holds. Note that V ′S is discounted by δC , not by λC = δC(1 − β).
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We find the condition for pˆseq1 as follows.
VS ≥ δCV ′S ⇐⇒ v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC − pˆ
seq
1 ≥
v(n)− v(nS)
1− λC × δC
⇐⇒ pˆseq1 ≤
(1 + δC − λC)v(nS)− (δC − λC)v(n)
1− λC =
v(nS)− δCβ{v(n)− v(nS)}
1− λC
Thus, the firm charges the following period 1 price.
pˆseq1 = max
{
v(nS)− δCβ{v(n)− v(nS)}
1− λC , 0
}
As described above, this price has to satisfy pseq1 > v(1)/(1−λC). The condition that the parameters
should satisfy is as follows.
v(nS)− δCβ{v(n)− v(nS)}
1− λC >
v(1)
1− λC ⇐⇒ δCβ <
v(nS)− v(1)
v(n)− v(nS)
Using pˆseq1 and pˆ
seq
2 , we obtain the corresponding profit of the firm and the consumer surplus, as
shown in Proposition 5.
Finally, we prove that there is no equilibrium in which only a portion of sophisticated consumers
purchase at period 1 and the remaining sophisticated consumers do so at period 2. Let ntS be
the number of sophisticated consumers who purchase at period t. Given that n1S sophisticated
consumers purchase at period 1, each naive consumer at period 2 expects that the network size
will become n1S + 1 if he/she purchases the good. That is, the price of period 2 will be set at
p2 = v(n
1
S+1)/(1−λC) < pseq2 . Note that this price is lower than the equilibrium price. Eventually,
all naive consumers join the network and derive the following surplus.
V 2S = VN =
v(n)− v(n1S + 1)
1− λC
In this case, sophisticated consumers who purchase at period 1 obtain the following surplus.
V 1S = v(n
1
S) +
λCv(n)
1− λC − p1
Consider a deviation such that one sophisticated consumer postpones purchasing to period 2. Then,
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each naive consumer at period 2 expects that the network size will become n1S if he/she purchases
the good. That is, the price of period 2 will be set at p2 = v(n
1
S)/(1− λC) < pseq2 . Eventually, all
naive consumers join the network and derive the following surplus.
V ′S =
v(n)− v(n1S)
1− λC
There is no incentive for such a deviation if and only if:
V 1S ≥ V ′S
⇐⇒ v(n1S) +
λCv(n)
1− λC − p
seq
1 ≥
v(n)− v(n1S)
1− λC × δC
⇐⇒ p1 ≤ (1 + δC − λC)v(n
1
S)− (δC − λC)v(n)
1− λC <
(1 + δC − λC)v(nS)− (δC − λC)v(n)
1− λC = p
seq
1 .
That is, to ensure that such a deviation is unprofitable, the period 1 price should be set at a
lower price than the equilibrium price (i.e., p1 < p
seq
1 ). However, setting such a low price never
improves the profit of the firm. Therefore, there is no equilibrium such that only a portion of the
sophisticated consumers purchase at period 1 and the remaining do so at period 2.
Proof of Proposition 6
Comparing the profits under simultaneous- and sequential-diffusion prices, we have the following
condition for pˆiseq > pisim.
pˆiseq > pisim ⇐⇒ nS (1 + δC − λC)v(nS)− (δC − λC)v(n)
1− λC + δF · nN
v(nS + 1)
1− λC > n
v(1)
1− λC
⇐⇒ δF > nv(1)− nS {(1 + δC − λC)v(nS)− (δC − λC)v(n)}
nN · v(nS + 1) ≡ fˆ(δC , β)
Proof of Proposition 7
This proof is similar to that for Proposition 5. First, we consider the price of period 2, p˜seq2 ,
given that all sophisticated consumers purchase at period 1. At the beginning of period 2, all naive
consumers observe that the current network size is nS . In addition, each of them anticipates that if
he/she joins the network, the network size becomes nS+1, which will continue over future periods.
Therefore, the firm sets the price of period 2 at p˜seq2 = v(nS + 1)/(1 − λC) to induce all naive
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consumers to purchase, which is equal to pˆseq2 .
Next, let us consider the decision on the period 1 price, p˜seq1 . When the firm commits to setting
the period 2 price at p˜seq2 , sophisticated consumers cannot win any price discount if they postpone
their purchase to the next period. Therefore, even if the price of period 1 is set at sophisticated
consumers’ willingness to pay, they will purchase the good at period 1, which implies that the firm
set the price of period 1 at p˜seq1 = uS(t = 1|pseq) = v(nS) + λCv(n)/(1− λC).
Using p˜seq1 and p˜
seq
2 , we obtain the corresponding profit of the firm and consumer surplus as
shown in Proposition 7.
Proof of Proposition 8
Comparing the profits under simultaneous- and sequential-diffusion prices, we have the following
condition for p˜iseq > pisim.
p˜iseq > pisim ⇐⇒ nS
{
v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC
}
+ δF · nN v(nS + 1)
1− λC > n
v(1)
1− λC
⇐⇒ δF > nv(1)− nS {(1− λC)v(nS) + λCv(n)}
nN · v(nS + 1) ≡ f˜(λC)
Proof of Lemma 5
We consider the following two cases.
(i) 0 ≤ λC < λ¯C
In this case, from the definition of λ¯C , p
seq < pseq2 holds as follows.
λC < λ¯C ⇐⇒ v(nS) + λCv(n)
1− λC <
v(nS + 1)
1− λC ⇐⇒ p
seq < pseq2
Next, we prove that pseq1 < p
seq, as follows.
pseq − pseq1 = v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC −
(1 + δC − λC)v(nS)− (δC − λC)v(n)
1− λC
=
(1− λC)v(nS) + λCv(n)− (1 + δC − λC)v(nS) + (δC − λC)v(n)
1− λC
=
δC{v(n)− v(nS)}
1− λC > 0
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That is, pseq1 < p
seq < pseq2 holds for λC ∈ [0, λ¯C).
(ii) λ¯C ≤ λC < 1
First, it can be confirmed that pseq2 = p
seq = v(nS + 1)/(1− λC) holds. Next, we prove that
pseq1 < p
seq
2 , as follows.
pseq2 − pseq1 =
v(nS + 1)
1− λC −
(1 + δC − λC)v(nS)− (δC − λC)v(n)
1− λC
=
v(nS + 1)− v(nS) + δCβ{v(n)− v(nS)}
1− λC > 0
That is, pseq1 < p
seq
2 = p
seq holds for λC ∈ [λ¯C , 1).
Proof of Proposition 10
Suppose that the discount factor for the firm δF is sufficiently large. We consider the following
two cases.
(i) 0 ≤ λC < λ¯C
In this case, it holds that β > 1− λ¯C/δC .
piseq < pˆiseq ⇐⇒ (nS + δFnN )
[
v(nS) +
λCv(n)
1− λC
]
< nS
(1 + δC − λC)v(nS)− (δC − λC)v(n)
1− λC + δF · nN
v(nS + 1)
1− λC
⇐⇒ δC
δF
· nS
nN
<
v(nS + 1)− v(nS)
v(n)− v(nS) − λC
⇐⇒ δC
δF
· nS
nN
< λ¯C − λC
(ii) λ¯C ≤ λC < 1
In this case, it holds that pseq1 < p
seq
2 = p
seq as shown in Lemma 5. Therefore, piseq > pˆiseq
always holds.
In sum, we obtain the condition for piseq < pˆiseq as follows.
δC
δF
· nS
nN
< λ¯C − λC
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